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Equal Opportunity, Not Equal Results: 
Benign Racial Favoritism to Remedy Mere Statistical 
Disparate Impact Is Never Constitutionally Permissible 
Alamea Deedee Bitran*
“The worst form of inequality is to try to make unequal things equal.”  
–Aristotle1
I. INTRODUCTION
Using a minimum height or weight requirement?2 Relying on 
standardized test results or a selection committee for promotion or hiring 
decisions?3 Refusing to hire people taking narcotics or with a documented 
criminal background?4 Beware: you could be liable under Title VII5 for 
disparate impact without a shred of discriminatory intent. 
Title VII’s disparate impact provision is directly at odds with the Equal 
Protection Clause6 and courts are incorrectly using it as the test for illegal 
discrimination. Title VII’s disparate impact provision conflicts with the 
Equal Protection Clause, as it mandates racial classification by imputing 
liability based on racial proportions, forcing employers to make race-based 
decisions. 
*     J.D. candidate, May 2016, Florida International University College of Law. An earlier version 
of this paper earned First Place in the Pacific Legal Foundation’s March 2015 Law Student Writing 
Competition. This version incorporates Supreme Court case law that was released after the competition.
1 CLAUDI ALSINA & ROGER B. NELSON, WHEN LESS IS MORE: VISUALIZING BASIC
INEQUALITIES xiii (2009).
2 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (finding a disparate impact on women from 
minimum height and weight requirements for a correctional officer position).
3 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (opining that standardized test results for 
promotion lacked a strong basis in evidence in that specific situation to prevail on a disparate impact 
claim); Watson v. Fort Worth, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (finding subjective decision making from a selection 
committee for promotion qualifies as a specific policy or practice under Title VII for disparate impact 
liability).
4 See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (declining to find a disparate 
impact on minorities when job applicants on narcotics were disqualified because the transit authority 
rebutted statistics with the business necessity of needing alert employees to operate the transit system); 
Waldon v. Cincinnati Pub. Schs., No. 1:12-CV-00677, 2013 WL 1755664, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 24, 
2013) (finding a disparate impact on minorities from a criminal background check to determine 
employment opportunities). 
5  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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The proper test for illegal discrimination that complies with the Equal 
Protection Clause was set forth in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.7 In Yick Wo, the 
Supreme Court found that to prevail on a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff 
must provide evidence of discriminatory animus along with statistical 
disparities.8 Statistical disparate impact alone was insufficient.9
Specifically, the Court opined that “whatever may have been the intent of 
the ordinances as adopted, they are applied by the public authorities . . . 
with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by 
the state of that equal protection of the laws.”10
In May 2015, in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs 
v. Inclusive Communities Project, the Supreme Court confirmed that within 
the context of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) to prevail on a disparate impact 
claim, a plaintiff cannot merely show statistical disparities, and “a 
disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity must fail if the 
plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that 
disparity.”11 In its statutory interpretation of the viability of a disparate 
impact claim under the FHA, the Court explained the importance of 
maintaining a “robust causality requirement” because any more lenient 
causation standard would allow defendants to “resort to the use of racial 
quotas.”12
Although the Court’s Inclusive Communities Project decision was a 
step in the right direction because it confirmed that a meritorious disparate 
impact claim under the FHA must rely on more than just statistical 
disparities, the Court’s decision was strictly a statutory one, thus leaving the 
constitutional problem with disparate impact unresolved.13 In response to 
7   118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
8 See id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 373.
11 See 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2512 (2015). 
12 Id.
13 Inclusive Communities Project was a strictly statutory-based decision and the Court limited its 
analysis to determining if disparate impact was a cognizable claim as provided for under the FHA. See
generally id. at 2516 (noting that it was engaging in a statutory analysis of the FHA, not a constitutional 
analysis, the Court opined “[t]he issue here is whether, under a proper interpretation of the FHA, 
housing decisions with a disparate impact are prohibited”); see also id. at 2521 (“Recognition of 
disparate-impact claims is consistent with the FHA’s central purpose.”); id. at 2525 (“The Court holds 
that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act upon considering its results-
oriented language, the Court’s interpretation of similar language in Title VII and the ADEA, Congress’ 
ratification of disparate-impact claims in 1988 against the backdrop of the unanimous view of nine 
Courts of Appeals, and the statutory purpose.”); id. at 2519 (“Title VII’s and the ADEA’s ‘otherwise 
adversely affect’ language is equivalent in function and purpose to the FHA’s ‘otherwise make 
unavailable’ language. In these three statutes the operative text looks to results. The relevant statutory 
phrases, moreover, play an identical role in the structure common to all three statutes: Located at the end 
of lengthy sentences that begin with prohibitions on disparate treatment, they serve as catchall phrases 
looking to consequences, not intent. And all three statutes use the word ‘otherwise’ to introduce the 
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the Inclusive Communities Project decision, legal scholar Roger Clegg 
commented, “[g]iven that the Court was unanimous, then, in recognizing 
the constitutional problems and bad policy results than can arise from the 
disparate-impact approach, conservative litigators have no reason not to 
continue to press courts to reject or at least limit the approach in other 
cases.”14
Replacing merit-based selection, Title VII’s disparate impact provision 
points a litigation revolver at employers, encouraging de facto quota 
systems with preferential treatment based solely on race. The threat of 
disparate impact liability incentivizes racial stereotyping and group based 
discrimination, which is exactly what the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits.15 Title VII’s disparate impact provision incites Equal Protection 
violations because “if the Federal Government is prohibited from 
discriminating on the basis of race, then surely it is also prohibited from 
enacting laws mandating that third parties . . . discriminate on the basis of 
race.”16 As Chief Justice Roberts opined, “[t]he way to stop discrimination 
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”17 To be 
constitutional, statutes should preclude “treatment of individuals as simply 
components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.”18
II. THE INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES PROJECT DECISION’S LIMITS:
WHAT IT SOLVED AND WHAT IT LEFT UNADDRESSED
Disparate impact liability under the FHA, although recently approved 
under a statutory analysis, is unconstitutional as applied if courts allow 
litigants to bring such claims solely based on statistical disparities without a 
showing of discriminatory intent. By way of a hypothetical, an article 
illustrated the problem with disparate impact if grounded solely in statistical 
disparities:
Suppose, for example, that the owner of an apartment complex decides 
that she does not want to rent units to individuals who have been 
results-oriented phrase. ‘Otherwise’ means ‘in a different way or manner,’ thus signaling a shift in 
emphasis from an actor’s intent to the consequences of his actions.”). 
14  Roger Clegg, The Supreme Court’s Bad “Disparate Impact” Decision, NAT’L REV. (June 25, 
2015, 3:00 PM), www.nationalreview.com/article/420319/supreme-courts-bad-disparate-impact-deci
sion-roger-clegg (“[T]he law is now better because Justice Kennedy himself recognizes that the 
disparate-impact approach can lead to very bad results.”). 
15 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Project on Fair Representation in Support of Petitioners, Mt. 
Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1507), 
2013 WL 6040047.
16 See id. at 3 (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(citations and quotations omitted)).
17  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007). 
18 See City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978). 
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convicted of drug offenses. She makes that decision without regard to 
race, her policy on its face does not treat people differently because of 
race, and indeed she enforces it in an evenhanded way, so that it 
applies equally to all applicants, without regard to race. Should she be 
liable for racial discrimination under the Fair Housing Act if it turns 
out that the policy in her neck of the woods has a disproportionate 
effect on this or that racial or ethnic group?19
Arguably, under the Court’s May 2015 Inclusive Communities Project 
opinion, the answer to this hypothetical would be “maybe.” Under Inclusive
Communities Project, the Court recognized that the FHA does in fact 
provide for disparate impact liability, a question that courts have grappled 
with for decades.20
Inclusive Communities Project was a qualified victory for the 
government because it upheld the viability of disparate impact claims under 
the FHA pursuant to the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 
(HUD) new regulations, but it also provided critical caveats that have left 
the door open to eventually implement the appropriate constitutional test for 
liability as proposed by this Comment.21 The Inclusive Communities Project 
case was a statutory decision, not a constitutional one, as indicated by the 
Court’s elaborate analysis of whether the FHA’s text and legislative history 
provided for disparate impact liability.22
Prior to granting certiorari in Inclusive Communities Project, the Court 
granted certiorari on two similar cases that questioned the constitutionality 
of a disparate impact claim under the FHA, but both of those cases settled 
before the Court could weigh in on the issue.23 In anticipation of Inclusive
Communities Project finally deciding the viability of disparate impact under 
the FHA, commentators predicted that the Inclusive Communities Project 
19  John Fund, The Supreme Court’s Disparate Impact Decision Is a Disaster, NAT’L REV. (June 
26, 2015, 4:00 AM), www.nationalreview.com/article/420339/supreme-courts-disparate-impact-deci
sion-disaster-john-fund (quoting Roger Clegg). 
20  Courts have grappled with the question of whether or not the FHA provides for disparate 
impact liability for decades. See generally Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. 
Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 377 (3d Cir. 2011); Magner v. Gallagher, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010); Charleston 
Hous. Auth. v. USDA, 419 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2005); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 
F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977) (all being presented with the issue of whether the FHA provides for disparate 
impact liability). 
21 See generally Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015); see also Clegg, The Supreme Court’s Bad “Disparate Impact” Decision, supra
note 14 (“[T]he law is now better because Justice Kennedy himself recognizes that the disparate-impact 
approach can lead to very bad results.”). 
22 See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2516 (“The issue here is whether, under a proper 
interpretation of the FHA, housing decisions with a disparate impact are prohibited.”). 
23 See Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013) 
(granting certiorari); Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (granting certiorari).
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case “could indirectly be the most important public school desegregation 
case since Brown v. Board of Education.”24 Unfortunately, the Court did not 
decide the constitutional question and limited its holding to whether the 
FHA permits disparate impact liability, thus leaving the constitutionality of 
disparate impact claims unaddressed. 
In Inclusive Communities Project, the federal government provided 
low-income tax credits that Texas’ Department of Housing and Community 
Affairs (Department) distributed to developers.25 A non-profit organization, 
the Inclusive Communities’ Project, Inc. (ICP), that assists low-income 
families in finding affordable housing brought a disparate impact claim 
under the FHA.26 The ICP alleged that the Department’s tax credit 
distributions caused the continuation of segregated housing patterns by the 
Department’s allocation of more credits to housing in inner-city areas and 
too few credits in suburban areas.27
The FHA provides that it is unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent . . . or 
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to a person because of 
race.” 28 Additionally, the FHA states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business 
includes engaging in real estate-related transactions to discriminate 
against any person in making available such a transaction, or in the 
terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, 
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.29
Finding that the FHA’s “to otherwise make unavailable” language was 
the functional equivalent of the Age Discrimination Employment Act 
(ADEA) and Title VII’s “effects” language which provided for disparate 
impact, the Court held that the FHA’s text provides for disparate impact 
liability.30 The Court hypothesized that Congress did not use identical 
language in the FHA as it did in Title VII and the ADEA, which explicitly 
24 See Valerie Strauss, A Supreme Court Case That Public Education Advocates Should Be 
Watching, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2015), www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2015/01/13/
a-supreme-court-case-that-public-education-advocates-should-be-watching.
25 Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2510. 
26 Id.
27 Id.
28  42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). 
29  42 U.S.C. § 3605(a).
30 See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2519 (“Title VII’s and the ADEA’s ‘otherwise 
adversely affect’ language is equivalent in function and purpose to the FHA’s ‘otherwise make 
unavailable’ language. In these three statutes the operative text looks to results. The relevant statutory 
phrases, moreover, play an identical role in the structure common to all three statutes: Located at the end 
of lengthy sentences that begin with prohibitions on disparate treatment, they serve as catchall phrases 
looking to consequences, not intent. And all three statutes use the word ‘otherwise’ to introduce the 
results-oriented phrase. ‘Otherwise’ means ‘in a different way or manner,’ thus signaling a shift in 
emphasis from an actor’s intent to the consequences of his actions.”). 
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provided for disparate impact with clear “effects” language because it 
“would have made the relevant sentence awkward and unclear.”31
Additionally, interpreting the FHA to not provide for disparate impact 
would render Congress’ various amendments to the FHA superfluous.32
The Court acknowledged the constitutional aspects at stake with 
disparate impact claims but did not engage in a comprehensive 
constitutional analysis, as it grounded its holding in the FHA’s statutory 
allowance for disparate impact claims.33 Although the Court found that the 
FHA authorized disparate impact, it importantly noted that the outer 
contours of such claims must be limited by constitutional safeguards.34
The majority explained that 
disparate-impact liability has always been properly limited in key 
respects that avoid the serious constitutional questions that might arise 
under the FHA, for instance, if such liability were imposed based 
solely on a showing of a statistical disparity. Disparate-impact liability 
mandates the “removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary 
barriers,” not the displacement of valid governmental policies. The 
FHA is not an instrument to force housing authorities to reorder their 
priorities. Rather, the FHA aims to ensure that those priorities can be 
achieved without arbitrarily creating discriminatory effects or 
perpetuating segregation.35
Noting the constitutional limitations on disparate impact claims and 
further supporting this Comment’s thesis that mere statistical disparities do 
not pass constitutional muster, the Court held that “disparate-impact 
liability has always been properly limited in key respects to avoid serious 
constitutional questions that might arise under the FHA, e.g., if such 
liability were imposed based solely on a showing of a statistical 
disparity.”36
Providing a burden-shifting framework with a defense available to 
those accused of disparate impact violations, the Court explained “[a]n 
important and appropriate means of ensuring that disparate-impact liability 
is properly limited is to give housing authorities and private developers 
leeway to state and explain the valid interest their policies serve.”37
31 Id.
32  Id. at 2520. 
33 See id. at 2522. 
34 See id.; see also Paul Hancock, Symposium: The Supreme Court Recognizes but Limits 
Disparate Impact in Its Fair Housing Act Decision, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2015, 8:58 AM),
www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/paul-hancock-fha.  
35 Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2522 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
36 Id. at 2512 (emphasis added). 
37 Id.
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Acknowledging that there are material differences between the FHA and 
Title VII, and therefore supporting this Comment’s premise that disparate 
impact claims supported solely by statistics are unconstitutional, the Court 
stated “the Title VII framework may not transfer exactly to the fair-housing 
context, but the comparison suffices for present purposes.”38 To guard 
against abuse39 of disparate impact claims by holding individuals “liable for 
racial disparities that they did not create,” the Court emphasized that “racial 
imbalance does not, without more, establish a prima facie case of disparate 
impact.”40 Noting that disparate impact is not without limits, the Court 
instructed that the judiciary “should avoid interpreting disparate-impact 
liability to be so expansive as to inject racial considerations into every 
housing decision.”41
The majority’s opinion in Inclusive Communities Project left the 
elephant in the room unanswered: is disparate impact constitutional? This 
Comment argues that disparate impact, without requiring more than mere 
statistics to form a cognizable claim, is unconstitutional, specifically in the 
workforce. Supporting the proposition that disparate impact has no place in 
the workforce under Title VII, Justice Thomas’ dissent opined that he 
would not amplify the error from Griggs, which applied disparate impact to 
Title VII.42 His dissenting opinion stated that the Inclusive Communities 
Project majority’s basis for upholding the disparate impact regime “is made 
of sand” and accused disparate impact proponents of “doggedly assum[ing] 
that a given racial disparity at an institution is a product of that institution 
rather than a reflection of disparities that exist outside of it.”43
Justice Thomas’ dissent highlights the unanswered concerns associated 
with disparate impact. Specifically, constitutional concerns are especially 
alarming when disparate impact claims are brought within the employment 
context under Title VII, because multiple factors, not just race, tend to play 
a role in employment-related decisions. Unrealistically attempting to isolate 
employment decisions down to race being the sole reason for an employer’s 
actions disregards other disparities that exist that might justify certain 
employment decisions, such as different skill sets, education, or even 
nepotism, all lawful reasons for employment decisions. 
38 Id. at 2523. 
39 Id. at 2524 (“The limitations on disparate-impact liability discussed here are also necessary to 
protect potential defendants against abusive disparate-impact claims. . . . Remedial orders that impose 
racial targets or quotas might raise more difficult constitutional questions.”). 
40 Id. (quotations omitted). 
41 Id. at 2524. 
42 Id.
43 Id. at 2526, 2529. 
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III. RELEVANT SCHOLARSHIP & CASE LAW:
EQUAL PROTECTION & TITLE VII 
Two legal scholars, Roger Clegg and Professor Richard Primus, have 
attacked disparate impact and written scholarship on its unconstitutionality. 
Roger Clegg opined that “the disparate impact theory continues to be used 
in a manner that far exceeds the legitimate purpose of countering hidden 
discrimination.”44 Disparate impact liability without proof of discriminatory 
intent aims to mandate “equal results.”45 Conversely, the Equal Protection 
Clause ensures “equal opportunity,” not “equal results.”46
To illustrate the problematic unconstitutional effect of disparate 
impact, Roger Clegg explained: 
If a business, agency or school has standards for hiring, promoting, 
admissions or offering a mortgage that aren’t being met by individuals 
in some racial and ethnic groups, there are three things that can be 
done. First, the standards can be relaxed for those groups. That is what 
racial preferences do. Second, the government can attack the standards 
themselves. That is what the disparate-impact approach to enforcement 
does. Third, one can examine why a disproportionate number of 
individuals in some groups aren’t meeting the standards—such as 
failing public schools or being born out of wedlock—and do 
something about it.47
In another article in which he commented on the Inclusive
Communities Project decision, Roger Clegg emphasized the Catch-22 
situation that disparate impact places employers in: either eliminate 
innocent policies to avoid a lawsuit or start paying very close attention to 
your racial proportions and adjust accordingly to avoid a lawsuit: 
The disparate-impact approach pushes potential defendants to do one 
or both of two things: Get rid of perfectly legitimate selection criteria 
or apply those criteria in a race-conscious way so that the resulting 
44  Roger Clegg, Disparate Impact in the Private Sector: A Theory Going Haywire, 5 
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGIS., REG. & LITIG. 12 (2001). 
45 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). 
46 See generally Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kansas City, 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970) 
(“[T]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that each qualified voter must 
be given an equal opportunity to participate.”); United States v. Com. of Virginia, 52 F.3d 90, 93 (4th 
Cir. 1995) (“Women need not be guaranteed equal ‘results’ in this respect, but the Equal Protection 
Clause does require equal opportunity to obtain these results.”); Yellow Springs Exempted Vill. Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 647 F.2d 651, 665 (6th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he equal 
protection clause requires at least an equal opportunity for female athletes to play any contact sport.”). 
47 Roger Clegg, “Disparate Impact at Harvard Law School”, CTR. FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
(Apr. 21, 2015, 08:00 AM), www.ceousa.org/issues/other-issues/disparate-impact/891-disparate-impact-
at-harvard-law-school.
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racial double standard will ensure that the numbers come out right. In 
other words, we’re supposed to stop judging people by the content of 
their character, and start judging them by the color of their skin. And 
the fact of the matter is, there is probably no selection criterion—not a 
single one—that does not have a disparate impact on some group or 
subgroup.48
Similarly, Professor Richard Primus reasoned that disparate impact 
undoubtedly raises constitutional concerns.49 Specifically, he reasoned: 
A statutory regime that directs government officials (overtly) and 
private employers (tacitly) to monitor the racial composition of 
workforces, and that is in some way concerned with the allocation of 
employment opportunities among racial groups, does raise equal 
protection issues on the currently prevailing understanding of equal 
protection.50
This Comment joins scholarship such as Roger Clegg and Professor 
Richard Primus by examining in depth disparate impact’s unconstitutional 
effects and further analyzing the dangers of disparate impact permeating not 
only the employment sphere, but now extending to other spheres such as the 
housing and educational spheres. 
A.  Equal Protection Case Law 
The single most important constitutional principle that guards 
individual rights is the concept of “equal protection of the laws,” found in 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.51 The Equal 
Protection Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”52 Equal Protection, 
via reverse incorporation through the Fifth Amendment’s due process 
clause, applies to both the federal government and the states.53 The Equal 
Protection Clause does not mandate that everyone receive the same
treatment.54 Instead, it demands that similarly situated individuals are 
48  Roger Clegg, A Decision with a Disparate Impact Against Common Sense, WASH. EXAM’R
(June 29, 2015, 12:44 PM), www.washingtonexaminer.com/a-decision-with-a-disparate-impact-against-
common-sense/article/2567234.
49  Richard Primus, Equal Protection & Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493
(2003).
50 Id. at 585–86.
51 THOMAS BAKER & JERRE WILLIAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN A NUTSHELL 394 (2d ed.
2003).
52  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
53 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
54 Id.
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treated similarly.55 Both minorities and non-minorities can bring an Equal 
Protection claim.56
Classifications that advantage or disadvantage one group of people 
over another are reviewed with a certain level of scrutiny depending on the 
type of classification made. When a classification “neither proceeds along 
suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights,” it will be 
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause “if there is any reasonably 
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the 
classification.”57 Rational basis review is the “paradigm of judicial 
restraint.”58 In Railway Express Agency v. New York, the Court found that 
New York’s advertisement restrictions were reasonable and satisfied 
rational basis review.59
Racial classifications, however, are reviewed under a more stringent 
standard. The strongest suspect class is race, as it an immutable 
characteristic.60 Strict scrutiny, requiring more than reasonableness, 
mandates that the classification be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling 
interest.61 When a classification is based on race, it invokes strict scrutiny 
review, and the Equal Protection Clause frequently bans such a 
classification as unconstitutional.62
The Supreme Court established that “all racial classifications 
reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly 
scrutinized.”63 Strict scrutiny review of an Equal Protection claim “is not 
dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular 
classification.”64
In Bakke, the Court, using strict scrutiny review, struck down a 
medical school’s quota system that reserved sixteen out of one hundred 
seats for minorities.65 The Bakke quota system violated the Equal Protection 
Clause because the sixteen seats that were reserved for minorities were 
completely off limits to white applicants.66 Minority applicants had access 
55 Id.
56 Id.
57  FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
58 Id. at 314.
59  336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
60 See Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 825 (2008) (opining that immutable 
characteristics are “distinguishing” and define people “as a discrete group”). 
61 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (reasoning “our cases 
have been explained in opinions by terms ranging from ‘strict scrutiny’ at one extreme to ‘rational basis’ 
at the other”). 
62 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265 (1978). 
63  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 202 (1995).  
64 Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989)).
65 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. 
66 Id.
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to all one hundred seats when applying, whereas white applicants only had 
access to eighty-four seats.67
White applicants, though similarly situated to minority applicants 
because they were applying to that medical school, were not given similar 
opportunities, as the sixteen minority seats were entirely off limits to white 
candidates.68 Justice Powell opined that “[p]referring members of any one 
group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its 
own sake.”69 The Court found that race can only be used as a “plus” factor, 
but not the sole factor, when evaluating a student’s application.70
Additionally, Justice Powell emphasized the “importance of considering 
each particular applicant as an individual.”71 He reasoned that the 
“guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one 
individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If 
both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal.”72
Building on its anti-quota precedent, the Court decided Gratz v. 
Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger73 on the same day, altering the meaning 
of “strict scrutiny” in the context of higher education. In Grutter, the 
University of Michigan Law School sought to ensure diversity in its student 
body, but when it denied a white applicant admission, she sued alleging 
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.74 The Court 
opined that “[a]ll government racial classifications must be analyzed by a 
reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”75 The Court found that the University 
of Michigan Law School had narrowly tailored its admissions program 
because the university considered race as one factor in its holistic view of 
its applicants.76 Race was not the sole factor.77
That same day, the Court struck down the University of Michigan’s 
undergraduate admissions program because it was not narrowly tailored to 
the compelling interest of diversity.78 In Gratz v. Bollinger, two white 
applicants sued after they were rejected by the University of Michigan, 
alleging that they were qualified for admission but were rejected because 
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 307.
70 Id. at 317–19.
71 Id. at 289.
72 Id. at 289–90. 
73  539 U.S. 306, 306 (2003). 
74 Id.
75 Id. at 308.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78  539 U.S. 244, 244 (2003). 
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they were white.79 The white applicants brought an equal protection lawsuit 
because if they had been a minority with the same qualifications, they 
would have been offered admission.80 The Supreme Court found that the 
University of Michigan’s undergraduate program was allocating points to 
minority applicants that would ensure their admission over their non-
minority competitors.81 The University categorized African-Americans, 
Hispanics, and Native Americans to be “underrepresented minorities” and 
admitted “virtually every qualified applicant” if he or she was a member of 
one of those ethnicities.82
The University used a point system to determine admissions.83 If an 
applicant earned one hundred points, he or she was offered admission.84 The 
University awarded twenty points to minority applicants just for being 
African-American, Hispanic, or Native American.85 That one-fifth point 
boost solely due to checking off an ethnicity box significantly increased 
minority applicants’ chances of reaching one hundred points for 
admission.86
Only twelve points were awarded to an applicant who had a perfect
SAT score.87 Additionally, only five points at most were awarded if an 
applicant had artistic talents that “rivaled that of Monet or Picasso.”88 The 
District Court opined that the twenty points allocated to minorities for being 
minority members was “not the functional equivalent of a quota system 
because minority candidates were not isolated from review by virtue of 
those points.”89 The Supreme Court rejected the District Court’s 
interpretation, and opined that for three years, the University’s admission 
system “operated as the functional equivalent of a quota running afoul of 
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion.”90
The Court struck down the admissions policy which “automatically 
distributes 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee 
admission, to every single ‘underrepresented minority’ applicant solely 
because of race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in 
79 Id.
80 Id. at 262. 
81 Id.
82 Id. at 244.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 DANIEL E. BRANNEN ET AL., SUPREME COURT DRAMA: CASES THAT CHANGED AMERICA
576–80 (2d ed. 2011). 
88  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 273 (2003).  
89 Id. at 258.
90 Id. at 245. 
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educational diversity that respondents claim justifies their program.”91
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1, racial classifications for high school district placement that were 
based on race were invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause.92 The 
school district’s allegedly compelling interest in diversity did not justify its 
mechanical racial classifications.93 Additionally, the school district failed to 
show that the racial classifications were necessary to achieve diversity.94
The Court emphasized the Grutter decision’s endorsement of diversity as a 
compelling interest did not mean that diversity was “focused on race 
alone.”95 Instead, diversity must encompass “all factors that may contribute 
to student body diversity” such as “having overcome personal adversity and 
family hardship.”96
Outside of the higher education context, racial classifications rarely 
satisfy strict scrutiny review. In City of Richmond v. Croson, the Court 
evaluated a City’s affirmative action plan which mandated contractors 
subcontract at least 30 percent of its business to minority business 
enterprises (MBE).97 The Court found that for an affirmative action plan to 
comply with the Equal Protection Clause, there must be a specific finding 
of past discrimination that the plan seeks to remedy.98 After determining 
that the City did not have a history of past discrimination, the Court opined 
that the plan was not narrowly tailored.99
Six years later in Adarand, the Court struck down an affirmative action 
plan because the racial classification ran afoul of the Equal Protection 
Clause and failed to satisfy strict scrutiny review.100 In Adarand, a 
subcontractor that was not awarded a federal construction project 
challenged the federal practice of giving contracts to minority 
contractors.101 Emphasizing the importance of protecting “persons, not 
groups,” the Court held that an affirmative action plan was not narrowly 
tailored to meet a compelling interest.102
The Court found that “all governmental action based on race—a group 
classification long recognized as ‘in most circumstances irrelevant and 
91 Id. at 270.
92  551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
93 See id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 703.
96 Id. at 702.
97 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 200 (1995). 
101 Id.
102 Id. at 228.
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therefore prohibited’—should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to 
ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been 
infringed.”103
Since Croson104 and Adarand,105 to comply with the Equal Protection 
Clause, express racial classifications are only permissible in exceptional 
circumstances and are subject to strict scrutiny review. Under Bakke, “racial 
and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for 
the most exacting judicial examination.”106 Under Adarand, “any person, of 
whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject 
to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to 
unequal treatment under the strictest of judicial scrutiny.”107
 B.  Title VII Disparate Impact Case Law 
Title VII provides for disparate impact liability in § 703(k)(l)(A): 
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is 
established under this subchapter only if— 
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a 
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent 
fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the 
position in question and consistent with business necessity.108
To make a prima facie disparate impact case, a plaintiff must show that 
“a facially neutral employment practice has a significantly discriminatory 
impact.”109 Additionally, a plaintiff must show “statistical evidence of a 
kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused 
the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their 
membership in a protected group.”110
When there is a disparate impact as a result of a facially neutral 
employment practice, Title VII requires employers to articulate a business 
necessity.111 Additionally, Title VII requires employers to demonstrate that 
there are no equally effective ways to accomplish its goal without 
103 Id.
104  Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
105 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 202 (finding that “strict scrutiny is the proper standard for analysis of 
all racial classifications, whether imposed by federal, state or local actor”).  
106  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
107 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224.
108  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 703(k)(l)(A). 
109 See EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1274 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations 
omitted).  
110 See id. at 1274–75 (citations omitted).  
111  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A). 
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conferring a disparate impact.112
The Court’s first disparate impact case, Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
established that for a plaintiff to prevail, statistical evidence of disparate 
impact must be accompanied by proof of discriminatory animus.113 In Yick
Wo, a San Francisco ordinance entrusted the “naked and arbitrary power” in 
a board to decide which laundries were granted a license to use wooden 
buildings.114 Approximately 200 Chinese laundry owners applied for 
licenses but not one of them were granted a license by the board.115 In 
contrast, all non-Chinese applicants for the laundry license except one were 
granted a license.116 The Court concluded that the board’s actions were “so 
unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State.”117
Additionally, the Court opined that although the law was facially neutral, it 
was “applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an 
unequal hand.”118 The circumstantial evidence that the petitioners presented 
supported that the board was operating with a discriminatory animus when 
it denied all 200 of the Chinese laundry owners’ applications for licenses.119
After the Court was unable to discern a reason for the license denials 
“except hostility to the race and nationality,” the Court struck down the 
ordinance under the Equal Protection Clause.120
In contrast to the Yick Wo constitutional discriminatory animus 
requirement, Title VII disparate-impact laws prohibit “facially neutral . . . 
practices that have significant adverse effects on protected groups . . . 
without proof that . . . those practices” were “adopted with a discriminatory 
intent.”121 An employer can incur liability under a Title VII disparate 
impact theory when a facially neutral practice disproportionally impacts a 
protected class.122
After Yick Wo, the Supreme Court addressed disparate impact under 
Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,123 when plaintiffs challenged a high 
school diploma employment requirement. The diploma requirement 
112 Id.
113  118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
114 Id. at 366.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 373.
118 Id. at 373–74.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 374.
121  Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986–87 (1988).
122  See EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1278 (11th Cir. 2000) (opining “the 
central difference between disparate treatment and disparate impact claims is that disparate treatment 
requires a showing of discriminatory intent and disparate impact does not”). 
123  401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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disparately impacted African American potential applicants.124 To avoid 
liability under Title VII, the company was required to show a “business 
necessity” and that there were no less discriminatory alternative practices to 
accomplish that business necessity.125 Without an explicit showing of 
intent,126 the Court imposed disparate impact liability reasoning that the 
diploma requirement was used as a proxy for race.127 The Court found that 
the purpose of Title VII was to remove “artificial, arbitrary, and 
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously 
to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible 
classification.”128 Deviating from its Yick Wo rationale requiring a showing 
of discriminatory animus, the Court held that “good intent or the absence of 
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing 
mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups.”129
Criticizing the Court’s deviation from requiring a showing of 
discriminatory animus for a disparate impact claim, Justice Thomas accused 
the Court four decades later of building on bad precedent set forth in 
Griggs, instead of overturning it.130 Justice Thomas cautioned, “[w]hatever 
respect Griggs merits as a matter of stare decisis, I would not amplify its 
error by importing its disparate-impact scheme into yet another statute.”131
Five years after Griggs, the Court declined to impose disparate impact 
liability absent discriminatory animus in Washington v. Davis because the 
defendants demonstrated that a standardized test was directly related to 
necessary job skills.132 In Davis, white police officers scored higher than 
African American police officers on a qualifying standardized test.133
The African American police officers brought a disparate impact claim 
against the Metropolitan Police Department.134 The Court refused to allow 
“a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of 
government to pursue . . . invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply 
because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.”135
124 Id. at 427.
125 Id.
126  Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2543 
(2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Griggs was a case in which an intent to discriminate might well have 
been inferred. The company had openly discriminated on the basis of race prior to the date on which the 
1964 Civil Rights Act took effect.”) (quotations omitted). 
127  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). 
128 Id. at 431.
129 Id. at 432.
130 See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2526 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
131 Id.
132  426 U.S. 229 (1976).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 242. 
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The Court reasoned, 
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole 
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the 
Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule, that racial 
classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are 
justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.136
The Court found that “government actions that are not undertaken for a 
racially discriminatory motive but have a disproportionate adverse impact 
on blacks do not trigger the ‘strict scrutiny’ that attends race-based 
classifications.”137 After finding a rational basis for the police exam, the 
Court held that the exam was valid.138 Building on its job related defense, 
the Court found that a showing of job relatedness can rebut a disparate 
impact claim supported solely by statistics. In New York City Transit 
Authority v. Beazer, the Court found that the New York Transit Authority 
successfully rebutted a disparate impact lawsuit.139 The Transit Authority 
had a general policy of refusing to hire people who used narcotics.140
Plaintiffs claimed the policy disparately impacted minorities because 
large amounts of minorities were on methadone, which disqualified them 
from employment with the Transit Authority.141 In response, the Transit 
Authority rebutted the lawsuit by showing that there was a business 
necessity for the policy.142 The Transit Authority needed its workers to be 
“persons of maximum alertness and competence” because the transit system 
involved highly safety sensitive tasks.143 The Court found that the Transit 
Authority rebutted the lawsuit and that the policy was not motivated by 
racial animus.144
Approximately three decades after Davis,145 the Court faced a 
momentous disparate treatment claim that originated from an employer’s 
attempt to avoid liability under a disparate impact claim. In Ricci v. 
DeStefano, seventy-seven New Haven firefighters took an exam for 
promotion to lieutenant.146 Of the thirty-four candidates that passed, twenty-
136 Id. (citations omitted). 
137 See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 91 (3d ed. 2008).
138 Id.
139  440 U.S. 568 (1979).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 571.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 579.
145  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
146  557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
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five were white, six were African American, and three were Hispanic.147 All 
ten candidates that were eligible for promotion were white.148 As a result of 
the white candidates outperforming the minority candidates, the minority 
candidates threatened litigation.149 After public debate, the City of New 
Haven discarded the test results fearing a disparate impact lawsuit.150
After the City decided not to certify the test results and denied the 
passing candidates the right to promotion, seventeen white candidates and 
one Hispanic candidate filed a disparate treatment lawsuit against the 
City.151 The white firefighters argued that it is never “permissible for an 
employer to take race-based adverse employment actions in order to avoid 
disparate-impact liability.”152
The Court reasoned that discarding the test results was impermissible 
unless the City could prove that it had a “strong basis in evidence that, had 
it not taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact 
statute.”153 The Court qualified its holding by opining, “[w]e also do not 
hold that meeting the strong-basis-in-evidence standard would satisfy the 
Equal Protection Clause in a future case . . . we need not decide whether a 
legitimate fear of disparate impact is ever sufficient to justify discriminatory 
treatment under the Constitution.”154
The Court noted that the City lacked a strong basis in evidence to 
believe it would lose if challenged with a disparate impact lawsuit.155
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, explained that “a threshold 
showing of a significant statistical disparity, and nothing more–is far from a 
strong basis in evidence that the City would have been liable under Title 
VII had it certified the results.”156 Kennedy wrote that the City could have 
successfully defended a disparate impact lawsuit with a business necessity 
and least discriminatory means showing.157
Additionally, the Court opined that Congress did not intend to provide 
an exception for employers to discriminate via disparate treatment to avoid 
disparate impact lawsuits: 
147 Id. at 566.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 574. 
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 580. 
153 Id. at 563.
154 Id. at 585.
155 Id. at 563. 
156 Id. at 559. 
157 Id.
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Allowing employers to violate the disparate-treatment prohibition 
based on a mere good-faith fear of disparate-impact liability would 
encourage race-based action at the slightest hint of disparate impact. A 
minimal standard could cause employers to discard the results of 
lawful and beneficial promotional examinations even where there is 
little if any evidence of disparate-impact discrimination. That would 
amount to a de facto quota system, in which a “focus on statistics . . . 
could put undue pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate 
prophylactic measures.” Even worse, an employer could discard test 
results (or other employment practices) with the intent of obtaining the 
employer’s preferred racial balance.158
IV. TITLE VII’S DISPARATE IMPACT PROVISION 
VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
By imposing liability based on statistical disparities alone, Title VII 
circumvents the Equal Protection Clause by eliminating a plaintiff’s burden 
of proving discriminatory animus. Benign racial favoritism to remedy mere 
statistical disparate impact alone is never constitutionally permissible. 
Harvard Professor Richard Primus noted, “equal protection has become 
hostile to government action that aims to allocate goods among racial 
groups, even when intended to redress past discrimination.”159 After Ricci,
“Title VII’s disparate impact provision can withstand constitutional attack 
only if it satisfies strict scrutiny—that is, if it is narrowly tailored to achieve 
a compelling government interest.”160
The Court has not analyzed the conflict between Title VII’s disparate 
impact provision and the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Scalia opined in 
his concurrence in Ricci that the Court’s decision: 
[M]erely postpones the evil day on which the Court will have to 
confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-
impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection? . . . 
[T]he war between disparate impact and equal protection will be 
waged sooner or later.161
The Court views governmental racial classifications skeptically 
because they “can only exacerbate rather than reduce racial prejudice” and 
“delay the time when race will become a truly irrelevant, or at least 
158 Id. at 582–83 (emphasis added).
159  Primus, supra note 49, at 496. 
160  Lawrence Rosenthal, Saving Disparate Impact, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2157, 2180 (2013).
161  Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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insignificant factor.”162
In Adarand, the Court reasoned that “[u]nless Congress clearly 
articulates the need and basis for a racial classification, and also tailors the 
classification to its justification, the Court should not uphold this kind of 
statute.”163 Disparate impact liability violates the Equal Protection Clause, 
as requiring proportional results in employment decisions is not narrowly 
tailored.
A. The Injustices Perpetrated by Racial Favoritism Outweigh  
 Its Possible Benefits 
Professor Allan Ornstein opined that instead of remedying previous 
injustices, when the federal government enacts affirmative action programs, 
it fails “to recognize or admit that it is only perpetrating other injustices.”164
Ornstein opined that “by ignoring differences in qualifications, the federal 
government is undermining the integrity and scholarly functions of the 
university.”165 Illustrative of Ornstein’s thesis, Stuart Gould and Pierre Van 
den Berghe conducted an affirmative action study in which they sent out 
identical resumes to 176 graduate programs.166 The researchers created a 
fictitious resume for a graduate student “ostensibly finishing up his/her 
Ph.D. at the University of Washington.”167
The resume was distributed to all of the schools with the same 
qualifications, and the only variables were the sex, race, and marital status 
of the fictitious applicant.168 Half of the “applicants” volunteered their 
ethnicity as “Afro-American” while the other half “made no mention of 
ethnicity or race.”169 The affirmative action study found that of the ninety-
six university replies, the schools that received the African-American 
fictitious resume responded at 61.4 percent and followed up with a 44.4 
percent active interest in pursuing that candidate.170
In contrast, of the schools that received the resumes of candidates that 
did not specify an ethnicity, there was a 47.7 percent university response 
rate with only a 9.5 percent active follow up rate.171 This study is illustrative 
of the injustices that are perpetrated when employers or universities are 
162  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 299 (1995).  
163 Id.
164 Allan C. Ornstein, Quality, Not Quotas, 13(2) SOC’Y 10 (Jan./Feb. 1976). 
165 Id.
166 Stuart H. Gould & Pierre L. Van def Berghe, Particularism in Sociology Departments’ 
Hiring Practices,  15 RACE & CLASS 106 (1973), http://rac.sagepub.com/content/15/1/106.full.pdf+html.
167 Id. at 107. 
168 Id. at 108. 
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
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pressured to accept a certain proportion of each race or ethnicity. 
Additionally, accepting proportional amounts of each race arguably 
does not achieve the “diversity” that the proponents of such affirmative 
action programs claim they seek. A Stanford Alumni article explained “if 
‘diversity’ were really the goal, then preferences would be given on the 
basis of unusual characteristics, not on the basis of race. The underlying 
assumption—that only minorities can add certain ideas or perspectives—is 
offensive not merely because it is untrue but also because it implies that all 
minorities think a certain way.”172 The article’s authors, Stanford Law and 
the University of Chicago Law graduates, proposed alternative criteria to 
race to achieve “diversity” such as grades, test scores, athletics, music, 
clubs, leadership roles, and other extracurricular activities.173 The article 
highlights that by implementing affirmative action programs, it works to the 
disadvantage of the individuals such programs are designed to protect.174
The authors explained: 
Perhaps the most tragic side effect of affirmative action is that very 
significant achievements of minority students can become 
compromised. It is often not possible to tell whether a given student 
genuinely deserved admission to Stanford, or whether he is there by 
virtue of fitting into some sort of diversity matrix. When people do 
start to suspect the worst—that preferences have skewed the entire 
class—they are accused of the very racism that justifies these 
preferences. It is a strange cure that generates its own disease.175
B.  Equal Protection Demands People Are Treated as Individuals, Not as 
Members of a Specific Ethnic or Racial Group 
Title VII’s disparate impact provision violates Justice Powell’s Bakke
opinion, in which he opined that “[p]referring members of any one group 
for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own 
sake.”176 Mandating certain racial compositions goes against what the Equal 
Protection Clause demands after Bakke, in which the Court “emphasized the 
importance of considering each particular applicant as an individual.”177
Justice Powell found that the “guarantee of equal protection cannot mean 
one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied 
to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, 
172  David Sacks & Peter Thiel, The Case Against Affirmative Action, STANFORD ALUMNI, http://
alumni.stanford.edu/get/page/magazine/article/?article_id=43448 (emphasis added). 
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978). 
177  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271 (2003).  
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then it is not equal.”178
Additionally, Title VII’s disparate impact provision violates Justice 
Powell’s standard because the consequences of liability based on statistics 
alone forces employers to accord more weight to minorities over non-
minorities in promotional or hiring decisions. Like the University of 
Michigan violated the Equal Protection Clause in Gratz179 by utilizing an 
overly mechanical system as a way to determine admissions, Title VII’s 
disparate impact provision unconstitutionally provides for liability absent a 
showing of discriminatory intent. 
Mechanically imputing liability based solely on statistics is not 
narrowly tailored and runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. Further 
violating Equal Protection precedent, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie 
case against an employer under Title VII’s disparate impact provision 
solely on the basis of race, lacking the Grutter180 requirement of a “holistic” 
review of the case.181
Correctly recognizing the importance in treating people as individuals 
and not as members of a protected class, Justice Scalia opined that: 
In my view, government can never have a “compelling interest” in 
discriminating on the basis of race in order to “make up” for past racial 
discrimination in the opposite direction. . . . To pursue the concept of 
racial entitlement—even for the most admirable and benign of 
purposes—is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of 
thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In 
the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American.182
The distinction between goals and quotas “is a matter of semantics.”183
Further, scholars have opined that affirmative action programs actually hurt 
the intended minority beneficiaries.184
Following the Gratz185 and Grutter186 precedent, the Equal Protection 
Clause demands that Title VII’s disparate impact provision be found 
unconstitutional. The proper test, which was set forth in Yick Wo, demands 
178 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289–90. 
179 See Gratz, 539 U.S. 244.
180 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 306 (2003).
181 See Eang L. Ngov, When “The Evil Day” Comes, Will Title VII’s Disparate Impact 
Provision Be Narrowly Tailored to Survive an Equal Protection Clause Challenge?, 60 AM. U. L. REV.
535 (2011).
182  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995).  
183 Id.
184  Heather Mac Donald, Affirmative Disaster: A Duke Study Documents the Harm Racial 
Preferences in College Admissions Can Do to the Intended Beneficiaries, WEEKLY STANDARD (Feb. 20, 
2012), www.weeklystandard.com/articles/affirmative-disaster_626632.html.
185  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 244 (2003). 
186  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 306 (2003). 
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a showing of discriminatory intent to prevail on a disparate impact claim.187
C.  Indications the Court Will Eventually Invalidate Title VII’s Disparate 
Impact Provision 
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly weighed in on the 
constitutionality of Title VII’s disparate impact regulations, the Court 
indicated that it would rule them invalid in Alexander v. Sandoval.188 In 
Alexander, the plaintiff alleged that the driver’s license exams, which were 
given in English, had a disparate impact on people not fluent in English.189
Justice Scalia opined that he could not help but notice “how strange it 
is to say that disparate-impact regulations are ‘inspired by, at the service of, 
and inseparably intertwined with’ § 601, when § 601 permits the very 
behavior that the regulations forbid.”190
Further, in response to its legal problems with affirmative action 
programs at the University of Michigan, Michigan voters supported a 
proposition to amend its state constitution to prohibit affirmative action.191
Proposal 2 was an amendment to the Michigan constitution, which was 
approved in 2006 by 58 percent of Michigan’s voters.192 Michigan Attorney 
General Bill Schuette explained “our constitution requires equal treatment 
in college admissions, which is an expression by 58% of Michigan voters in 
2006 that says it is fundamentally wrong to treat people differently based on 
race or the color of their skin.”193 The Sixth Circuit struck down Proposal 
2.194
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and upheld the 
constitutionality of Proposal 2, which prohibited “preferential treatment to, 
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or 
national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or 
187 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
188  532 U.S. 275 (2001); John Martin, School Discipline and Disparate Impact, 13 ENGAGE: J.
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 30 (2012).
189 Alexander, 532 U.S. 275.
190 Id. at 286 n.6. 
191 John R. Martin, Fourteenth Amendment––Equal Protection Clause––Political-Process 
Doctrine––Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and 
Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 128 HARV. L. REV. 281 (2014), http://cdn.har
vardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/schuette_v_bamn.pdf. 
192  Adam Liptak, Court Backs Michigan on Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2014), 
www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/us/supreme-court-michigan-affirmative-action-ban.html?_r=0.
193  Greg Toppo, Affirmative Action Fading from College Scene, USA TODAY (Feb. 12, 2014, 
6:01 PM), www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/02/12/black-history-affirmative-action/5432107.
194  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action Integration & Immigrant Rts. & Fight for Equal, by Any 
Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc).
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public contracting.”195 The Court concluded that via state amendment, 
voters “may choose to prohibit the consideration of racial preferences in 
governmental decisions, in particular with respect to school admissions.”196
The highly publicized Schuette197 ruling was in line with the Ninth 
Circuit’s logic from over a decade earlier, which also found that a state 
constitutional ban on affirmative action did not run afoul of the Equal 
Protection Clause.198 In Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, the Ninth 
Circuit analyzed Proposition 209, an amendment to the California 
Constitution.199 The proponents’ argument for passing Proposition 209 was 
featured on the Ballot Pamphlet stating: 
A generation ago, we did it right. We passed civil rights laws to 
prohibit discrimination. But special interests hijacked the civil rights 
movement. Instead of equality, governments imposed quotas, 
preferences, and set-asides. Today, students are being rejected from 
public universities because of their RACE. Job applicants are turned 
away because their RACE does not meet some “goal” or “timetable.” 
Contracts are awarded to high bidders because they are of the preferred 
RACE. That’s just plain wrong and unjust. Government should not 
discriminate. It must not give a job, a university admission, or a 
contract based on race or sex. Government must judge all people 
equally, without discrimination!200
Remaining faithful to Supreme Court precedent on judicial review, the 
Ninth Circuit found California’s Proposition 209 constitutionally in line 
with the Equal Protection Clause. The Court opined that “[a] system which 
permits one judge to block with the stroke of a pen what 4,736,180 state 
residents voted to enact as law tests the integrity of our constitutional 
democracy.”201
195  Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rts. & Fight for 
Equal, by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1629 (2014).  
196 Id. at 1630. 
197 See id. 
198 See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).  
199 Id.
200 Id. at 696–97 (emphasis added). 
201 Id. at 699. 
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V. UNLESS THE COURT INVALIDATES DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER
TITLE VII, INDUSTRIES WILL BE CONTINUOUSLY THREATENED WITH A 
LITIGATION REVOLVER SOLELY PREMISED ON RACIAL OUTCOMES
A.  Disparate Impact’s Abuse Pursuant to Title VII in the Employment 
Sphere
The EEOC, DOJ, and individuals are using Title VII’s disparate 
impact provision as a means of bringing disparate impact lawsuits across 
industries. Lower courts are bombarded by disparate impact lawsuits 
yielding various conflicting results.202 Further, many states have adopted 
statutes authorizing the same practices that are frequently challenged by 
disparate impact lawsuits. For example, numerous states have authorized 
the use of criminal background checks for certain careers, yet under Title 
VII, such background checks could incite a disparate impact lawsuit.203
Disparate impact lawsuits ultimately harm those that they seek to 
protect because “[e]mpirical evidence suggests . . . that employers who are 
discouraged from checking into the criminal backgrounds of job applicants 
may simply avoid hiring from pools that they (correctly or incorrectly) 
perceive as high risk.”204 An article noted that Title VII was never meant to 
provide for disparate impact liability solely based on statistical disparities 
and emphasized that mandating de facto quota systems detracts from what 
should be the focus of employment related decisions: an applicant’s job 
qualifications.205 Indicating that job qualifications, not race, should be the 
focus of employment decisions, the co-managers on Title VII’s Senate 
floor, Senators Joseph Clark and Clifford Case, stated it “expressly protects 
the employer’s right to insist that any prospective applicant, Negro or white, 
202 Compare EEOC v. Freeman, No. RWT 09cv2573, 2013 WL 4464553, at *11 (D. Md. Aug. 
9, 2013) (opining that the idea of criminal background checks conferring a disparate impact is 
“laughable”), with Waldon v. Cincinnati Pub. Schs., No. 1:12-CV-00677, 2013 WL 1755664, at *1 
(S.D. Ohio Apr. 24, 2013) (finding a disparate impact on minorities from a criminal background check 
to determine employment opportunities). 
203 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW. § 5-561(b)(1)-(11) (West 2012) (requiring a criminal 
background check on employees at a child care center, juvenile detention, school, foster care, recreation 
center, camp, home health agency); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1-111 (West 2012) (requiring a criminal 
background check on employees in public, private, vocational, and technical schools); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 489.518 (West 2004) (requiring a criminal background check on applicants for alarm system jobs); 
Waldon v. Cincinnati Pub. Schs., No. 1:12-CV-00677, 2013 WL 1755664 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 24, 2013); 
see also Ingrid Cepero, Banning the Box: Restricting the Use of Criminal Background Checks in 
Employment Decisions in Spite of Employers’ Prerogatives, 10 FIU L. REV. 729 (2015) (arguing the 
validity of disparate impact claims arising from criminal background checks). 
204 Brief Amici Curiae of Gail Heriot, Peter Kirsanow, and Todd Gaziano in Support of 
Petitioner, Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(No. 11-1507), www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v2/
11-1507_pet_amcu_gh-pk-tg.authcheckdam.pdf.
205  Fund, supra note 19.
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must meet the applicable job qualifications. . . . Indeed, the very purpose of 
Title VII is to promote hiring on the basis of job qualifications, rather than 
on the basis of race or color.”206
In EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Learning Education Corporation, the 
EEOC brought a Title VII disparate impact lawsuit against Kaplan alleging 
that Kaplan’s use of credit reports in its hiring process had a disparate 
impact on black applicants.207 Kaplan chose to use credit reports as a means 
of screening job applicants after Kaplan previously discovered system 
breaches involving misappropriated funds by former dishonest 
employees.208
Kaplan used credit checks to determine whether applicants were 
“under financial stress or burdens that might compromise their ethical 
obligations.”209 Referring back to Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,210
the district court opined that the EEOC would need to show (1) a specific 
employment practice being challenged, and (2) establish with statistics that 
the identified employment practice caused the exclusion of a group because 
of their race.211
The EEOC attempted to use an expert witness who opined that more 
black applicants were flagged for review than white applicants under the 
credit check screening.212 Because they were flagged for their credit history, 
the expert’s opinion was unpersuasive, as there was a legitimate explanation 
for why those individuals were flagged.213
In granting summary judgment to Kaplan, the district court opined that 
“[b]ecause plaintiff fails to present admissible evidence showing that the 
use of credit reports ‘caused the exclusion of applicants . . . because of their 
membership in a protected group,’ plaintiff cannot set forth a prima facie 
case of disparate impact discrimination.”214 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the 
district court, finding that “[t]he EEOC brought this case on the basis of a 
homemade methodology, crafted by a witness with no particular expertise 
to craft it, administered by persons with no particular expertise to 
administer it, tested by no one, and accepted only by the witness 
himself.”215
206 Id.
207  No. 1:10 CV 2882, 2013 WL 322116, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2013).  
208 Id.
209 Id.
210  487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988). 
211 Kaplan, 2013 WL 322116, at *4. 
212  EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Learning Educ. Corp., 748 F.3d 749, 752 (6th Cir. 2014).   
213 Id.
214 Kaplan, 2013 WL 322116, at *12.   
215 Kaplan, 748 F.3d at 754.
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In addition to the Kaplan216 case, the EEOC sued Peoplemark, alleging 
that its policy of denying employment to applicants with felony records 
conferred a disparate impact on African Americans.217 The alleged policy of 
refusing to hire applicants with felony records did not even exist.218 The 
magistrate judge granted Peoplemark fees and costs of $751,942.48.219
After the magistrate judge opined that the complaint “turned out to be 
without foundation from the beginning,”220 the district judge adopted the 
magistrate judge’s recommendation.221 The Sixth Circuit affirmed and 
found that the EEOC’s disparate impact claim was “frivolous,” 
“unreasonable,” and “groundless.”222
The Kaplan223 and Peoplemark224 cases are two examples of many in 
which Title VII’s disparate impact theory can be abused and used to punish 
facially neutral policies absent discriminatory intent. Extending Title VII’s 
disparate impact liability to other statutes, the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
has interpreted Title VII and the FHA to provide for disparate impact 
liability.
Former Attorney General Eric Holder transformed the DOJ “into a 
routine instrument of social and racial policy” using a “disparate impact 
analysis to force racial adjustments on cities, police and fire departments 
and banks.”225 The disparate impact lawsuits were brought without “proven 
racial discrimination, as traditionally required[,]” and only used “arcane 
statistical analyses.”226
B.  Disparate Impact’s Alarming Extension into Schools Pursuant to
 Title VII 
Title VII is frequently used by the DOJ as a basis for regulations on a 
disparate impact theory.227 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601 
provides: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
216 Id.
217  EEOC v. Peoplemark, Inc., 732 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2013).  
218 Id. at 587.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 589.
221 Id. at 590.
222 Id. at 592.
223 EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Learning Educ. Corp., No. 1:10 CV 2882, 2013 WL 322116, at 
*754 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2013).   
224  EEOC v. Peoplemark, Inc., 732 F.3d 58, 5844 (6th Cir. 2013). 
225 Eric Holder’s Legacy of Politics, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2014, 7:52 PM), http://
online.wsj.com/articles/eric-holders-legacy-of-politics-1411689140.
226 Id.
227  Clegg, A Decision with a Disparate Impact Against Common Sense, supra note 48.
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benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.”228
Citing to Bakke,229 the Supreme Court noted that “only intentional 
discrimination was forbidden by § 601.”230 To bring disparate impact 
claims, the DOJ uses § 602, which authorizes federal agencies to enforce § 
601 with regulations.231 The Court has cautioned against conjuring up 
causes of action that are not authorized by statute by specifically stating that 
“[a]gencies may play the sorcerer’s apprentice but not the sorcerer 
himself.”232
Although Title VII does not reference disparate impact or have an 
“effects” language, the DOJ and the Department of Education are regulating 
schools under a disparate impact theory pursuant to § 602. Specifically, § 
602 states: 
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend 
Federal financial assistance . . . is authorized and directed to effectuate 
the provisions of [§ 601] . . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of 
general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the 
objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in 
connection with which the action is taken. 
The Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC) March 2012 statistics were 
accompanied by a quote illustrating the DOJ’s mission to use mere statistics 
to bring disparate impact claims. On the last page of its data collection 
report, the CRDC quotes Arne Duncan, the United States Secretary of 
Education: “The power of the Civil Rights Data Collection is not only in the 
numbers themselves, but in the impact it can have when married with the 
courage and will to change.”233
In a study comparing student enrollment rates to suspension rates 
across the twenty largest school districts, the CRDC reduced students down 
to their ethnicity as a defining sole characteristic.234 According to the 
CRDC, Miami-Dade County has a student enrollment of 9 percent whites, 
25 percent African American, and 65 percent Hispanic.235 The CRDC 
alleges that Miami-Dade County suspends 4 percent whites, 50 percent 
228  42 U.S.C. § 2000(d). 
229  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265 (1978). 
230  Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280–81 (2001). 
231  42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1; see also Alexander, 532 U.S. at 275. 
232 Id. at 291. 
233  Press Release, Dep’t of Educ., Off. for C.R., The Transformed Civil Rights Data Collection 
(CRDC) (Mar. 12, 2012), www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/crdc-2012-data-summary.pdf.
234 Id.
235 Id.
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African Americans, and 46 percent Hispanics.236 Based solely off of 
statistics, the DOJ brings civil rights lawsuits against schools that receive 
federal funding.237 When referring to statistics collected by the CRDC, U.S. 
Secretary of Education Duncan claims: “[t]hose facts testify to racial gaps 
that are hard to explain away.”238
Clegg cautions that disparate impact lawsuits will eliminate “perfectly 
legitimate policies because they have politically incorrect results,” or 
eliminate “the statistical imbalances through the use of surreptitious 
quotas.”239 Disparate impact lawsuits now extending from Title VII into the 
educational sphere will encourage less discipline or “school systems getting 
their numbers right by punishing white students who ought to not be 
punished or—more likely—by not disciplining black students who should 
be.”240
Confirming Clegg’s policy concerns, a Pennsylvania elementary 
school teacher, Allen Zollman, spoke out against the disparate impact 
lawsuits at the United States Commission on Civil Rights meeting in 
February 2011.241 Zollman explained the difficulties associated with making 
sure the proportion of students disciplined were evenly distributed across 
races:
Ultimately each instance of misbehavior in the classroom is unique 
and requires a customized response. It doesn’t matter what the 
ethnicity of the student is. If the child acts out and creates a distraction 
the other students will not learn. We’re talking about disparate impact. 
For a teacher, what is the greater disparate impact? When one student 
can say in effect, “indulge me or I will shut you down and there’s 
nothing you can do about it,” then 29 other children are prevented 
from learning. That is the greater disparate impact.242
Agreeing with Zollman’s concerns, political analyst Michael Barone 
criticized disparate impact liability from disproportionate school discipline 
statistics.243 Michael Barone reasoned, 
236 Id.
237 Id.
238  Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y of Educ., Remarks on the 45th Anniversary of “Bloody Sunday” at 
the Edmund Pettus Bridge, Selma, Alabama (Mar. 8, 2010), www2.ed.gov/news/speeches/2010/03/
03082010.html.
239 Roger Clegg, The Dangers of Disparate Impact, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2010), 
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/20/the-dangers-of-disparate-impact-policy.
240 Id.
241  U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., SCHOOL DISCIPLINE & DISPARATE IMPACT (2011), www.usccr.gov/
pubs/School_Disciplineand_Disparate_Impact.pdf.
242 Id.
243  Michael Barone, The Perverse Effects of Disparate-Impact Doctrine, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 14, 
2014), www.nationalreview.com/article/371083/perverse-effects-disparate-impact-doctrine-michael-barone.
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teachers and principals are now on notice that they may get into 
trouble if they suspend or penalize black students in disproportion to 
their numbers. It is not hard to imagine the likely results: quotas on 
student discipline and a double standard, if, as appears likely, black 
students misbehave at higher rates than non-blacks.244
Using Title VII’s McDonnell Douglas245 burden shifting framework, 
once a school is accused of illegal discrimination with a disparate impact 
lawsuit, the school is required to articulate a “substantial, legitimate 
educational justification.”246
Individuals are now bringing disparate impact lawsuits against schools 
if their children are suspended, claiming schools have a discriminatory 
agenda against minorities.247 For example, Latwaska Hamilton alleges that 
Hillborough County’s Benito Middle School was discriminating on the 
basis of race when it asked her fourteen year-old son to transfer after four
suspensions.248
Michael Barone attacked the concept of disparate impact and its 
unrealistic requirement that racial balances remain proportionate at all times 
despite other variables such as different skill sets across races.249 He stated, 
Ultimately, disparate-impact analysis rests on what ordinary citizens 
instinctively recognize as a fiction, the notion that in a fair society you 
would find the same racial and ethnic mix in every school, every 
occupation, and every neighborhood. This runs against the sometimes 
uncomfortable fact that abilities and interests are not evenly distributed 
among ethnic and racial groups.250
 Additionally, a professor brought a lawsuit on a disparate impact 
theory claiming that a fence along the United States-Mexico border could 
have a “disparate impact on lower-income minority communities.”251
Without Supreme Court guidance, there will be no stopping which 
industries and institutions are threatened with a litigation revolver via 
disparate impact lawsuits extending past Title VII. 
244 Id.
245  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
246  Ricardo Soto, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Off. for C.R., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Address 
Before the U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights’ Briefing on School Discipline & Disparate Impact (Feb. 11, 
2011), in  U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., supra note 241, at 55. 
247 Zack Peterson, Federal Complaint Questions How Hillsborough Disciplines Minority 
Students, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 29, 2014), www.tampabay.com/news/education/federal-complaint-
questions-how-hillsborough-disciplines-minority-students/2186514.
248 Id.
249  Barone, supra note 243. 
250 Id.
251  Gilman v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 09-0468, 2014 WL 984309, at *8 (D.D.C. Mar. 
14, 2014).
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C.  Disparate Impact’s Permeation of the Housing Sphere Under the FHA 
In addition to unconstitutionally instating de facto quotas in schools, 
the disparate impact revolver has now extended from Title VII to the 
FHA,252 mandating “equal results” in the housing arena with the purported 
blessing of the Supreme Court’s recent Inclusive Communities Project 
case.253 When presented with the opportunity to evaluate a disparate impact 
claim in the context of the FHA, the Court noted that there are 
constitutional constraints to prevent quotas, but ultimately decided the case 
on statutory grounds without explicitly providing a constitutional test for 
disparate impact liability.254 After signing amendments to the FHA, 
President Reagan cautioned: 
I want to emphasize that this bill does not represent any congressional 
or executive branch endorsement of the notion, expressed in some 
judicial opinions, that title 8 violations may be established by a 
showing of disparate impact of discriminatory effects of a practice that 
is taken without discriminatory intent. Title 8 speaks only to 
intentional discrimination.255
President Reagan’s qualifying statement noting that liability should 
only attach to intentional discrimination is indicative of the precautions that 
courts must take on disparate impact cases. In Inclusive Communities 
Project, the Supreme Court opined that the text of the FHA provides for 
disparate impact liability but more than mere statistical disparities are 
required to prevail on such a claim to ensure that defendants do not resort to 
the use of racial quotas.256
Over two decades before Inclusive Communities Project, in Town of 
Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, the Court affirmed the Second 
Circuit’s finding of disparate impact liability under the FHA.257 Oddly, the 
Court qualified its holding suggesting the Court did not entirely agree with 
allowing for disparate impact liability.258 The Court explained that it agreed 
with the appellate court’s finding of disparate impact liability because the 
defendant could not offer a legitimate reason for refusing to amend a zoning 
ordinance. Notably, the Supreme Court opined that it did not necessarily 
agree with the appellate court’s test for disparate impact, but that liability 
252  42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). 
253  See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2512 (2015). 
254 Id. at 2512. 
255  Remarks on Signing the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (Sept. 13, 1988), https://
reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1988/091388a.htm. 
256 See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2512. 
257  488 U.S. 15, 18 (1988). 
258 Id.
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was so glaring within the context of the facts of that case that it affirmed the 
appellate court: 
Since appellants conceded the applicability of the disparate-impact test 
for evaluating the zoning ordinance under Title VII, we do not reach 
the question whether that test is the appropriate one. Without 
endorsing the precise analysis of the Court of Appeals, we are satisfied 
on this record that disparate impact was shown.259
A district court has even stated that a disparate impact claim was 
“nothing more than wishful thinking on steroids.”260
VI. WHAT IS THE “MORE” THAT IS NEEDED TO MAKE A DISPARATE
IMPACT CLAIM BASED ON STATISTICS CONSTITUTIONAL
UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE?
Disparate impact based solely on statistics runs afoul of the Equal 
Protection Clause and the Court’s Yick Wo decision which required a 
showing of discriminatory animus for a disparate impact claim.261 Because 
the facts of every case differ, and there are many different ways a plaintiff 
can show discriminatory animus, this Comment does not have a formula 
that conveniently contours the specific parameters for determining when a 
claim is constitutionally permissible and when it is not. That would be 
unrealistically attempting to draw arbitrary lines in the sand. 
Instead, this Comment proposes that mere statistics are absolutely 
never constitutionally permissible, no matter how noble the purpose of the 
benign favoritism might be. That is the outer limit of what never constitutes 
a constitutional disparate impact claim. An example of this outer limit 
would be claims that rest solely on statistical disparities, such as the claims 
discussed in Section V(B) of this Comment being brought against schools 
when a disproportionate number of one racial group is assigned more 
detentions than another racial group, are never constitutionally 
permissible.262
Some claims that might satisfy the “something more” in addition to 
statistical disparities to indicate discriminatory animus would have to be 
similar to the standard set forth in Yick Wo.263 Section III(B) of this 
Comment discusses Yick Wo, and that the Court found that in addition to 
alarmingly one sided statistics, the “conclusion cannot be resisted that no 
259 Id.
260 See Lawrence Hurley, Court Rejects Obama Housing Bias Rule as “Wishful Thinking”,
REUTERS (Nov. 3, 2014), http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0IN24C20141103?irpc=932. 
261 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
262 See infra Section V(B) discussing disparate impacts abuse in the education sphere.  
263 See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356. 
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reason for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the 
petitioners belong.”264 Therefore, if there is no other possible lawful 
explanation for the statistical disparities other than discriminatory animus, 
then a disparate impact claim could satisfy the Equal Protection Clause’s 
demands. 
Once a plaintiff satisfies the constitutional safeguard of “something 
more” to show a defendant’s discriminatory animus, not just statistical 
disparities, this Comment urges courts to adopt a burden shifting framework 
similar to the one established in McDonnell Douglas to evaluate the 
claim.265 Although the McDonnell Douglas framework is traditionally a 
model for disparate treatment, some courts have already adopted a similar 
framework within the disparate impact context, as it allows courts to 
“consider the strength of the plaintiff’s showing of discriminatory effect 
against the strength of the defendant’s interest in taking the challenged 
action.”266
If a plaintiff brings a constitutionally permissible disparate impact 
claim, a defendant should be able to defend with a “sufficient business 
interest in the disputed practice.”267 Once a defendant presents a legitimate 
reason, such as: (1) all students who disobey classroom rules are disciplined 
regardless of their race,268 (2) we do not want to hire people that are on 
narcotics to operate trains regardless of their race,269 or (3) we promote 
people who perform the highest on job-related standardized tests regardless 
of their race,270 the burden will shift to the plaintiff to show that the 
purported legitimate reason is actually pretext for discrimination. Only then, 
if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant’s legitimate reason is pretext for 
discrimination, can a plaintiff prevail on a disparate impact claim. 
Unfortunately, the Court continues to dance around the constitutional 
implications of disparate impact claims by deciding cases on statutory 
grounds instead of head on addressing if such claims are constitutional, as 
seen in both Inclusive Communities Project and Ricci. In Inclusive
264  Id. at 374. 
265 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
266 See Johnson v. City of Memphis, 770 F.3d 464, 471 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Courts assess the 
viability of these claims using a three-step burden-shifting framework akin to the familiar McDonnell–
Douglas standard.”); Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Human Relations 
Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 372, 374 (6th Cir. 2007) (“In disparate-impact cases under Title VII, we apply a 
different version of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework than in disparate-treatment 
cases. We follow the same three steps: the plaintiff states a prima facie case; the defendant responds; the 
plaintiff rebuts the response.”). 
267 See Hollis v. Chestnut Bend Homeowners Ass’n, 760 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2014) (using a 
burden shifting framework similar to McDonnell Douglas to evaluate a disparate impact claim). 
268 See infra Section V(B). 
269 See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). 
270  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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Communities Project, the Court explained that disparate impact is not 
immune from constitutional constraints.271 The Court opined in Inclusive
Communities Project, “[w]ithout adequate safeguards at the prima facie 
stage, disparate-impact liability might cause race to be used and considered 
in a pervasive way and ‘would almost inexorably lead’ governmental or 
private entities to use ‘numerical quotas,’ and serious constitutional 
questions then could arise.”272 In Ricci, the Court noted “[o]ur statutory 
holding does not address the constitutionality of the measures taken here in 
purported compliance with Title VII. We also do not hold that meeting the 
strong-basis-in-evidence standard would satisfy the Equal Protection Clause 
in a future case.”273
Justice Scalia’s Ricci concurrence hit the nail on the head: the Court’s 
“resolution of this dispute merely postpones the evil day on which the Court 
will have to confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the 
disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection?”274
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Title VII’s threat of disparate impact liability 
incentivizes racial stereotyping and group based discrimination in 
employment, which is exactly what the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits.275 The Equal Protection Clause ensures equal opportunity, not 
equal results. 
The constitutionally appropriate test for disparate impact was 
established in Yick Wo, which required a showing of discriminatory intent, 
not just mere statistical disparities.276 Although intent can arguably be 
challenging to prove, that is not a reason for holding employers 
unconstitutionally liable for discrimination under a disparate impact theory. 
Statistics absent a showing of discriminatory intent should be outright 
rejected as conceivable disparate impact claims and found unconstitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause because one type of racial bias cannot be 
remedied by another.277 A Wall Street Journal editorial explained that 
unless disparate impact is eventually found unconstitutional, 
271 See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2523 (2015). 
272 Id.
273 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 584 (2009). 
274 Id. at 594. 
275 See Brief for Project on Fair Representation et al., supra note 15.
276  Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).  
277 See Disparate Scalia, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2015, 7:00 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/
disparate-scalia-1421971209.
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“municipalities, landlords, bank lenders, you name it, will inevitably adopt 
tacit racial quotas to ensure the numbers work out and thus avoid a possible 
HUD drive-by.”278
Like Parents Involved in Community Schools,279 where a school board 
violated the Equal Protection Clause by not narrowly tailoring its means of 
achieving diversity, Title VII’s disparate impact provision is not narrowly 
tailored to a compelling interest. Although there is an argument to be made 
drawing similarities between diversity being a compelling interest in the 
employment and higher education realms, such an argument falls short 
when looking at the underlying goals of both institutions. The employment 
realm, unlike higher education, lacks the inherent need for diverse views to 
broaden classroom teaching of young minds. Instead, the employment 
sphere is more akin to the Parents Involved in Community Schools
generalized situation, in which using race alone to achieve diversity was not 
narrowly tailored to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause.280 The Court 
opined in Parents Involved in Community Schools that diversity cannot be 
achieved by focusing on race alone, and instead must incorporate other 
factors such as adversity.281
Title VII’s disparate impact provision focuses liability solely on race, 
and although diversity is in some contexts a compelling interest, such 
generalized and mechanical racial classifications are not narrowly tailored. 
Unless invalidated, Title VII’s disparate impact provision will continue to 
unconstitutionally threaten employers solely based on statistics and 
continue extending beyond Title VII into the education and housing 
spheres. As Justice Thomas noted, “[t]he decision in Griggs282 was bad 
enough, but this Court’s subsequent decisions have allowed it to move to 
other areas of the law.”283
Proponents of disparate impact are attempting to connect 
disproportionate results in school discipline to disproportionate results in 
the housing sphere. For example, an amicus brief in support of the 
Petitioners in the Inclusive Communities Project case stated “racial isolation 
in schools is directly connected to racial isolation in housing patterns.”284
278 Id.
279  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
280 Id.
281 Id. at 702. 
282 Griggs was a seminal case that endorsed disparate impact liability in the employment context 
pursuant to Title VII.  
283  Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2531 
(2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
284  Brief for John. R. Dunne, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Tex. Dep’t of 
Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2014) (No. 13-1371), 2014 
WL 7405726.
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Unless the Court invalidates disparate impact on constitutional grounds, 
disparate impact proponents will continue to infiltrate the employment 
sphere with litigation solely based on statistical disparities. By 
mechanically imposing liability from statistics showing disproportionate 
race-based results, Title VII’s disparate impact provision in itself violates 
the constitutional right to equal protection. 
When Title VII’s disparate impact provision is eventually challenged, 
the Court should find disparate impact based solely on statistics 
unconstitutional. Without proof of discriminatory animus, as indicated by 
Yick Wo, disparate impact encourages impermissible and unconstitutional 
quotas in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. An attack on one 
amendment’s scope, is inadvertently an attack on every amendment, leaving 
the entire constitution possibly to be picked apart for scraps and burned to 
the ground. There is absolutely no lawful justification for making any class 
of people’s rights more worthy of protection than others. 
